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Analysis of oDAO Duties
  • Intro
  • Overview of Duties
    • ETH Balance Submission
    • MEV Penalties
    • Contract Upgrades
    • Scrub Check - Withrawal Credentials
    • Reward Tree - RPL Rewards
    • RPL Price Submisson
    • oDAO Settings
    • Reward Tree - Smoothing Pool
    • Scrub Check - Solo Migration
    • Scrub Check - LEB8 Migration
    • [TODO] pDAO/Guardian
  • Verifiable Off-Chain Calculations
  • Guardrails - Balance Submission
  • Guardrails - MEV Penalties
  • Fraud Proof Scrubs
  • MEV Stealing Proofs
  • MEV - Negative BC Commission
  • Fraud Proof Challenge Period
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Guardrails - MEV Penalties

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Last updated 2 years ago

The current version of MEV Penaltiesallows any number of penalties to applied to any number of minipools. But there is no need for unlimited penalties. There are 50,400 blocks per week, so that is a guaranteed upper bound. If we assume that then (with 99.9% probability) RP will not get more than 16,900 proposals per week. Using the current market share of ~2.45% gives less than 1300 proposals per week (with 99.9% probability).

So it should be possible to enforce a maximum number of penalties in a given interval to reduce impact of malicious behavior while still allowing for legitimate use of the penalty system. This limits penalties to 2500 per week. Again a (timelocked) pDAO setting might make sense here.

Completely penalizing all minipools would currently take ~156,000 penalties (~13k minipools, 2 strikes and 10 1.6 ETH penalties). Using the limit of 2500 penalties/week would reduce value at risk to less than 3.5% of node operator ETH.

RP will not represent more than 33% of the network
proof of concept