> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://knoshua.gitbook.io/analysis-of-odao-duties/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://knoshua.gitbook.io/analysis-of-odao-duties/overview-of-duties/rpl-price-submisson.md).

# RPL Price Submisson

The protocol needs the RPL price to determine minimum staked needed for creating new minipools, RPL rewards based on effective RPL staked, and size of RPL slashings. 

As of now (before Smartnode v1.9.0), the oDAO sources a [1inch oracle](https://github.com/1inch/spot-price-aggregator) for the price and votes on it the same way as in [ETH Balance Submission](/analysis-of-odao-duties/overview-of-duties/eth-balance-submission.md). Smartnode v1.9.0 uses a Uniswap v3 TWAP instead.

Impact of incorrect values is relatively limited. Setting a very low price would effectively block new minipools from being created (see also [oDAO Settings](/analysis-of-odao-duties/overview-of-duties/odao-settings.md) and [Scrub Check - Withrawal Credentials](/analysis-of-odao-duties/overview-of-duties/scrub-check-withrawal-credentials.md)) and could allow manipulation of RPL Rewards (see also [Reward Tree - RPL Rewards](/analysis-of-odao-duties/overview-of-duties/reward-tree-rpl-rewards.md)). Setting a very high price would allow anyone to unstake their RPL and creating new minipools with minimal or no RPL collateral.